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This research tests the effectiveness of foresight decision aids (single outcome 
and multiple outcome) and hindsight strategy (alternative outcome and 
alternative stakeholder) to mitigate auditors’ and evaluators’ judgment error. 
Two between subject experimental designs were conducted concurrently 
involving 282 participants. The results showed that the quality of auditors’ 
decisions increase and move to evaluators’ perspective. Meanwhile, the quality 
of evaluators’ decisions increase and move to auditors’ perspective. Other 
findings showed that both auditors and evaluators tend to pay more attention on 
negative than positive information. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recently, Indonesian public accountant profession has been scrutinized sharply in 
conjunction with numerous large corporate scandals which involved public accountants. 
The Government of Indonesia pays serious attention and forms Interdepartmental 
Committee to arrange a draft of law of public accountant. The draft stated that public 
accountant can be condemned. Public accountants can become target of litigations and 
potentially face legal problems. This is the point, that how to improve the quality of auditors’ 
decision process to avoid legal problems. 
 
When an auditor is facing litigation and accused of doing negligence, the evaluator will 
evaluate ex post whether the auditor due professional care in the conduct of his/her job ex 
ante. Auditors are in under uncertainty and have no outcome knowledge during their 
decision making process, while evaluators have outcome knowledge when evaluating the 
auditor’s performance ex ante. Differences in time perspective and the outcome effect is 
called hindsight bias (Kinney Jr 1994; Pohl 2007; Schkade & Kilbourne 1991). This is the 
second point, that how to mitigate hindsight bias experienced by evaluator. 
 
Previous research mitigated judgment error or hindsight bias from one side partially, such 
as from auditor side (Lowe & Reckers 2000), or from evaluator side (Anderson et al. 1997; 
Lowe et al. 2002; Narsa 2011). This research mitigated hindsight bias from both sides 
simultaneously. The research questions are: do negative outcomes affect auditor’s 
decision making process, and evaluator’s evaluation process; can foresight decision aids 
such as single and/or multiple outcomes mitigate auditor’s foresight bias;  
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can alternative outcomes strategy or stakeholder alternative strategy mitigate evaluator’s 
hindsight bias; do auditors and evaluators have a different susceptibility subject to cognitive 
bias; is hindsight bias mitigation strategy more effective in narrowing the gap between 
auditor and evaluator perspective compared with the foresight decision aids? 
 
The results showed that magnitude of auditors’ predictive judgment error is bigger than 
evaluators’ evaluative judgment error. Foresight decision aids mitigate predictive judgment 
error so that the quality of auditors’ decisions  increase similar to evaluators’ perspective. 
Meanwhile, the hindsight strategies mitigate evaluative judgment error so that evaluators’ 
decisions were much similar to auditors’ perspective. Statistically, the four mitigation 
strategies have no different effectiveness in narrowing the gaps of two perspectives. 
 
The rest of the paper discusses the theoretical justification for the hypotheses developed to 
address these issues. This is followed by a description of the experiment design used and 
the presentation of findings and discussion. The final section provides the conclusions, 
implications, and the limitations of the study. 
 
2. Theoretical Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Fischhoff (1975, p. 304) stated that “hindsight and foresight differ formally in the 
information available to the observer. The hindsightful judge possesses outcome 
knowledge, that is, he knows how things turned out. The foresightful judge does not”. 
Evaluators possess outcome information because their position in hindsight where the 
events had already occurred. While, decision makers does not possess such outcome 
because their position in foresight (Blank et al. 2007; Fischhoff 2007). Foresight bias 
reflects the inability in foresight to see how things will look in the future and hindsight bias 
reflects the inability in hindsight to see how things looked in the past (Kamin & Rachlinski 
1995). Operationally, foresight bias and hindsight bias are the difference between 
subjective probabilities of the occurrence of a given outcome estimated by persons who 
have outcome knowledge and those who do not (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham 1991; 
Lowe & Reckers 2000; Schkade & Kilbourne 1991). 
 
2.1 Foresight Perspective 
 
The difference in predictive judgment made by subjects who are given a negative outcome 
and those who are not is called hindsight bias (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham 1991; 
Schkade & Kilbourne 1991). Research conducted by Lowe (1992), Reimers (1992), and 
Lowe (2000) found that negative outcome affects predictive and evaluative judgments. 
Auditors, in an audit engagement, are responsible in evaluating whether substantial doubt 
exists about entity ability to continue as a going concern in a reasonable period in the 
future. Auditors must identify information and condition or circumstances (for example: 
obsolescence condition of inventory; negative profit trend, financial difficulty, labor conflict, 
lawsuits, new regulations issuance, patent loss, etc.) to gain confidence about clients’ 
ability to continue as going concern. Based on the judgment, auditors make decisions such 
as to what extent auditors adjust obsolete inventory and whether to expose the information 
in audit report or not. If the auditors  believe that there will be a negative outcome in their 
clients’ audit, they will act more carefully in making adjustment decisions.  
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H1: Auditors who are given negative outcome concerning their audit client will make a 
wider adjustment decisions than auditors who are not. 
 
2.2 Hindsight Perspective 
 
Evaluators tend to perceive that certain outcome is a series of occurrences that can be 
predicted hence the decision maker should be able to avoid a negative outcome. The 
outcome presented in legal cases is typically negative. The plaintiff usually experiences 
some undesirable outcome, which initiates litigations. The severity of a negative outcome 
can have dramatic affects on the size of hindsight bias, with larger bias resulting from more 
severe negative outcome (Harley 2007; Muller & Stahlberg 2007). Other researchers found 
that hindsight bias are larger if the subjects were given negative outcome than positive 
outcome (Casper et al. 1989; Hastie et al. 1999).  
 
H2: Evaluators who are given negative outcome concerning an audit client of a public 
accounting firm will consider that the auditor’s decision is worse compared to 
evaluators who are not given negative outcomes. 
 
2.3 Specific Knowledge Acquisition 
 
Lowe (1992) stated that cognitive bias can be moderated by acquiring specific domain of 
knowledge. Individuals who do not have knowledge of a certain field may adjust their tasks 
using cognitive heuristics. Based on this assertion, Christensen-Szalanski (1991) in a meta 
analysis study coded subjects who have a specific knowledge and/or direct experience 
related to their job as “familiar”, and coded as “not familiar” for subjects who do not have 
them. The result showed that “familiar” subjects significantly experienced lower hindsight 
bias than “not familiar” subjects. 
 
Auditors have specific knowledge in auditing, so they tend to rely less on the outcomes but 
more on the knowledge that serves as the basis of auditing process and its circumstances. 
Meanwhile evaluators lack knowledge on auditing and have limited understanding in 
factors and circumstances that direct financial and alternative outcomes from audit clients 
(Guilbault et al. 2004; Jones & Chen 2005). With these limitations evaluators tend to rely 
on outcomes.  
 
H3: Evaluators are more susceptible of hindsight bias exposure than auditors. 
 
Relying on outcome information reflects a relatively larger hindsight bias for evaluators and 
tends to be easily affected by bias mitigation strategy. Therefore, if evaluators who 
experience hindsight bias are aided by a signal to reconsider an alternative outcome or an 
alternative stakeholder, they will soon alter their judgment process in evaluating ex ante 
auditors’ performance.  
 
H4: Hindsight mitigation strategy is more effective than foresight decision aids in 
narrowing the gap between auditors’ and evaluators’ perspective. 
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3. Research Method 
 
Two experiments are conducted in a parallel order. First, auditors are surrogated by 
undergraduate accounting students who already passed auditing practice course; Second, 
evaluators are surrogated by undergraduate law students who already passed the law of 
criminal procedure and moot court course. Both experiments conducted from May 2012 to 
September 2012.   
 
Dependent variables for the first experiment are Partial Adjustment (PA) and Full 
Adjustment (FA). These variables are measured using 10 point scale: score 1 = not at all 
and score 10 = as wide as possible. The independent variables are two level outcomes: 
without outcome and negative outcome; and two level foresight decision aids: single 
outcome and multiple outcomes. Dependent variables for the second experiment are 
Adjustment Evaluation (AE) and Going Concern Evaluation (GE). These variables are 
measured using 10 points scale: score 1 = very inaccurate and score 10 = very accurate. 
Independent variables are two level outcomes: without outcome and negative outcome; 
and two level mitigation strategy: alternative outcome and alternative stakeholder. 
 
3.1 Case Material and Instrument 
 
Case material used in this research is derived from the material used by Lowe and 
Reckers (2000) with are adjusted for numbers and context for practicality in Indonesia. 
Each subject was given a material consisting an instruction booklet, case material, and list 
of questions. The background of the case is a hypothetical manufacturing company, “PT 
Buah Hati”, that produces children toys as a client with declining financial performance in 
the past few years. The case provides a summary of financial items and relevant 
qualitative information to provide an illustration of the size and internal condition of the 
company and its business environment. The focus of the scenario is the potential of 
obsolete inventory. 
 
The core of the first experiment is to ask the auditors to generate decision on the 
possibilities of adjustments of obsolete inventory to support an unqualified opinion. 
Auditors are asked to assess relevant factors. Meanwhile the core of the second 
experiment is to ask the evaluators to judge whether the auditors’ decision is accurate or 
absolutely inaccurate.  
 
3.2 Tasks and Experiment Procedures 
 
Subjects are distributed randomly into one of four groups for the first experiment and four 
groups for the second experiment. Foresight groups (auditors and evaluators) are only 
given basic case narration including relevant information factors. Subjects are asked to 
carefully read the case material and all information then answer the question in the list. The 
case material and list of questions used in this experiment have been through focus group 
discussions and two pilot tests. Hindsight groups (auditors and evaluators) are given not 
only basic case narration and relevant information factors but also negative outcome. 
Subjects are asked to read all case materials and provide assessment of the importance of 
the information factors, then answer the questions in the list.  
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Other groups are given basic case narration including relevant information factors, but 
each group receives different treatment. First, foresight+single outcome (F_SO) group 
(auditors) receive single outcome decision aids. This procedure directs subjects to 
consider negative outcome potential. Second, foresight+multiple outcomes (F_MO) group 
(auditors) receive the multiple outcomes decision aids. Subjects are directed to consider 
the various potential outcomes, positive and negative. Subjects are asked to provide the 
probability of occurrence of the given outcomes. Third, hindsight+alternative outcome 
(H_AO) group (evaluators) receive alternative outcome mitigation strategy based on an ex 
ante client condition. To increase the elaboration process, subjects are asked to assess 
the probability level of each alternative outcome. Subjects are also asked to identify other 
outcomes, if any, and provide their probability of occurrence. Fourth, hindsight+alternative 
stakeholder (H-AS) group (evaluators) receive a potential alternative stakeholder mitigation 
strategy. In this treatment, it is shown that the auditors have considered their 
responsibilities to other stakeholders and the potential loss which the stakeholders have to 
bear if the auditors are to take the opposite decision. Specifically, it is also illustrated that 
issuance of inappropriately opinion can cause loss to other stakeholders other than 
plaintiff. After thoroughly understanding the information and instructions, all subjects are 
asked to answer the questions in the list.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
4.1 Demographic Data and Manipulation Check 
 
Subjects who participate in both experiment are 282 students, but 26 are omitted due to 
failure in manipulation check. Furthermore, each cell contains 32 participants. The test 
result for randomization procedure shows insignificant F test score for all subject 
characteristics. It means all groups are equivalent. 
 
The test result for two basic assumptions of MANOVA such as equality of covariance 
matrices and equality of error variance can be fulfilled for both experiments.  Box’M test 
and the Levene’s test shows insignificant F test for all dependent variables. The result of 
the multivariate analysis to test whether each treatment affects both dependent variables 
showed that the F test is significant at the level less than one prevent. It can be concluded 
that each treatment is related to both dependent variables. Between subject test result 
shows that each treatment group has different effects on each dependent variable and 
significant at the level less than one percent. 
 
4.2 Existence of Hindsight Bias 
 
The existence of hindsight bias on auditors is robust.Test result for variable PA (Table 1) 
shows F = 7.318 (p = 0.000). The hindsight group response shows a mean of 6.8438 
higher than the foresight group response mean, 4.8750 (p = 0.000). Variable FA (Table 2) 
also shows a significant F test (F = 5.512, p =0.001). The hindsight group response shows 
a significant mean of 6.8750 higher than foresight group mean of 5.2500 (p = 0.002). 
These results show that subjects who are given negative outcome tend to suggest an 
adjustment of the inventory. This proves that auditors experience hindsight bias. This result 
supports the hypotheses one for both dependent variables PA and FA. 
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Table 1: ANOVA Findings for Dependent Variable PA 
 
Panel A: ANOVA 
 SS Df MS  F Sig. 
Between Group   66,023     3 22,008 7,318 0,000 
Within Group 372,906 124   3,007     
Total 438,930 127       
Panel B: Mean treatment 
 Group Mean Std. Dev. N 
Partial Adjustment 
  
  
  
Foresight 4,8750 1,51870   32 
Hindsight 6,8438 2,15690   32 
F_SO 6,2813 1,61114   32 
F_MO 6,0938 1,57315   32 
Total 6,0234 1,85907 128 
Panel C: Mean contrast 
Contrast
 
 Hypothesis Sig. 
Foresight vs. Hindsight 
Foresight vs. F_SO  
Foresight vs. F_MO 
          H1 
 
          0,000 
          0,008 
          0,029 
   
The results confirm prior research findings that the existence of hindsight bias is robust and 
found in various fields, designs, and magnitudes (Campbell & Tesser, 1983; Guilbault, et 
al., 2004; Pohl, 2007). In auditing, this result confirms the research findings of Lowe (1992), 
that both auditors and jurors are exposed by cognitive bias. Lowe and Reckers (2000) also 
find that auditors who are given negative outcomes make wider adjustments compared to 
subjects who are not. The essence of providing negative outcomes to the auditors is to 
identify whether they can think with a hindsight perspective, and whether their judgments 
can be moved to the hindsight perspective. When it can be moved to the hindsight 
perspective, foresight decision aids becomes a very useful support for auditors. 
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Table 2: ANOVA Findings for Depandent Variable FA 
 
Panel A: ANOVA 
 SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Group   51,523     3 17,174 5,512 0,001 
Within Group 386,344 124   3,116     
Total 437,867 127       
Panel B: Mean treatment 
Variable Group Mean Std. Dev. N 
Full Adjustment 
  
  
Foresight 5,2500 1,50269   32 
Hindsight 6,8750 2,02803   32 
F_SO 6,6875 1,80389   32 
F_MO 6,4688 1,85682   32 
Total 6,3203 1,88117 128 
Panel C: Mean contrast 
Contrast Hypotheses Sig. 
Foresight vs. Hindsight 
Foresight vs. F_SO 
Foresight vs. F_MO 
      H1 
       - 
       - 
        0,002 
        0,008 
        0,033 
   
Table 3: ANOVA Findings for Dependent Variable AE 
 
Panel A: ANOVA 
 SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between group    38,273     3 12,758 5,749 0,001 
Within Group 275,156 124   2,219   
Total 313,430 127    
Panel B: Mean treatment 
 Group Mean Std. Dev. N 
Adjustment 
Evaluation  
Foresight 4,7500 1,41421   32 
Hindsight 3,3438 1,42805   32 
H_AO 4,5313 1,52367   32 
H_AS 4,4688 1,58591   32 
Total 4,2734 1,57097 128 
Panel C: Mean contrast 
Contrast Hypotheses Sig. 
Foresight vs. Hindsight 
Hindsight vs. H_AO 
Hindsight vs. H_AS 
H2 
- 
0,001 
0,010 
0,016 
   
The result of one-way ANOVA (Table 3) showed F = 5.749 (p = 0.001). The mean 
response of hindsight group is 3.3488 lower than the mean response of foresight group of 
4.7500 (p = 0.001). This result reflects a significant difference of response between 
treatment groups in relation to their evaluation on auditors’ decisions, meanwhile, for 
variable GE, F = 4.692 (p = 0.004). The hindsight group (Table 4) shows a mean response 
(3.6250) lower than the foresight group response (5.0313, p = 0.005). This states that 
subjects who are given negative outcomes assess the going concern auditors’ decision 
worse than foresight group. Hence, H2 is empirically supported. 
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As found in other prior research (Anderson, et al., 1997), this research also finds that the 
judges’ evaluation depends on the outcome information. Subjects give worse evaluation on 
auditors’ decision when they already knew the negative outcome. Fischhoff (1975) also 
find that if the subjects who are given information of outcome and asked several probability 
ex ante the outcomes occurred, the answers are significantly higher than the subjects who 
are not informed. 
 
In auditing, Buchman (1985) tests the difference between estimated probabilities of 
bankruptcy of companies generated by subjects who are already informed accordingly, 
and with those who are not informed. The finding shows that hindsight subjects settle on a 
higher probability than the foresight subjects. Brown and Solomon (1987) who used 
business students in their experiment find different evaluation on investment decisions 
between hindsight and foresight subjects. 
 
Table 4: ANOVA Findings for Dependent Variable GE 
 
Panel A: ANOVA 
 SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between group    38,688     3 12,896 4,692 0,004 
Within Group 340,813 124   2,748   
Total 379,500 127    
Panel B: Mean treatment 
 Group Mean Std. Dev. N 
Going 
Concern 
Evaluation 
Foresight 5,0313 1,78677   32 
Hindsight 3,6250 1,71803   32 
H_AO 4,8125 1,55413   32 
H_AS  4,7813 1,56028   32 
Total 4,5625 1,72864 128 
Panel C: Mean contrast 
Contrast
 a)
 Hypotheses Sig. 
Foresight vs. Hindsight 
Hindsight vs. H_AO 
Hindsight vs. H_AS 
H2 
 
 
0,005 
0,025 
0,031 
 
4.3 Special Knowledge Acquisition 
 
Variance analysis of foresight bias magnitude (Table 5) shows F = 16.606 (p = 0.000), it 
means that there is a difference in magnitude of cognitive bias between auditors and 
evaluators. However, the mean magnitude of hindsight bias experienced by auditors is 
higher than evaluators. The results do not support H3 that evaluators would experience a 
larger cognitive bias compared to auditors. 
 
When the auditors are given negative outcome concerning their audit client, they quickly 
revise their beliefs so that their predictions are significantly different than those with no 
outcome information. On the other hand, the evaluators at hindsight position do not easily 
change their judgments on ex ante performance. They may be difficult to provide response 
as if they do not know the outcome. Consequently, distance of the difference of the 
evaluation between subjects who have outcome knowledge and those who do not have is 
not as wide as the distance experienced by the auditors. 
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Table 5: Magnitude of Hindsight Bias of Auditors vs Evaluators 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistic 
  N Mean SD SE 
ForesightAuditor vs HindsightAuditor 32 2,6406 1,30282 0,23031 
ForesightEvaluator vs HindsightEvaluator 32 1,6250 0,53882 0,09525 
Total 64 2,1328 1,11356 0,13920 
Model Fixed effect   0,99691 0,12461 
  Random effect    0,50781 
Panel B: ANOVA 
 SS df MS F Sig. 
Between Group 16,504   1 16,504 16,606 0,000 
Within Group 61,617 62   0,994   
Total 78,121 63    
      
Specific knowledge possessed by auditors, in fact, does not moderate hindsight bias. This 
result is opposite to the research conducted by Christensen-Szalanski et al. (1991) who 
finds that subjects with specific knowledge significantly experience less hindsight bias than 
subject with no specific knowledge. Other research, Lowe (1992), does not find evidence 
that acquiring specific knowledge can play a role as a moderator to hindsight bias. This 
research documented that both auditors and evaluators are exposed by the same 
magnitude of cognitive bias.  
 
Actually, Christensen_Szalanski et al. (1991) use subject with direct experience with their 
job, meanwhile this research uses inexperienced subjects. The difference in experience 
could be a noted as the source of potential problem of how the results are contradictory 
with the result of prior research. Novice auditors in this experiment do not have direct 
experience in auditing tasks, so when they are faced with a prediction task they can not 
recall the accumulated experience and knowledge in their memory. Consequently, when 
they are given the information about predictive outcome, they tend to rapidly revise their 
prior decision. On the other hand, novice judges who conduct evaluations task also do not 
have direct experience as a judge, so they tend to rely on the facts that the outcomes is 
negative. Therefore, although they are asked to disregard as if they do not know any 
outcome, they do not radically change their evaluation. This behavior can be explained 
using the primacy effect theory. According to this theory, the subjects consider the first time 
information they received as more important than the subsequent information. Hartono 
(2004, p. 27) calls it as “the attention decrement effect”, that the last evidence receives less 
attention than earlier evidence. In this case, when subject receive negative outcomes, they 
tend to form a belief that the auditors have failed or been wrong in the decision making 
process. Subsequent information of an alternative outcome will not forcefully alter their 
belief. 
 
4.4 Mitigation Strategy Effectiveness 
 
The variance analysis result (Table 6) shows F = 1.313 (p = 0.273), which means that 
statistically there are no significant differences between the four mitigation strategy. 
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Although the mean single outcome strategy of 0.5625 has the largest difference with the 
mean alternative stakeholder strategy of 1.1084, it is not sufficient to conclude that the 
alternative stakeholder strategy is more effective than the single outcome strategy (p = 
0.234). Based on the test results, hypothesis eight is not supported by empirical evidence. 
It means that the strategy which orientation is to change the evaluation process of judges 
has statistically insignificant different effectiveness with the other strategies. 
 
Lowe and Recker (1994) find that alternative outcome strategy is effective in reducing 
evaluators’ hindsight bias. Meanwhile, Anderson et al. (1997) finds otherwise, that 
alternative outcome strategy is not effective in decreasing hindsight bias but alternative 
stakeholder strategy is effective. In this case, there are differences in the subjects they use. 
Lowe and Recker use jurors to be, but Anderson et al. use experienced judges. This 
research uses law students. We expect that experience factors and subject groups may 
have a moderating effect in hindsight bias.  
 
Hindsight bias experienced by auditors is at level 1.97. After they are given a single 
outcome mitigation strategy the bias magnitude turns to 1.41. Therefore, single outcome 
decision aids can mitigate the bias by 0.56 (28.57%). On the evaluators’ side, hindsight 
bias magnitude before given a mitigation strategy is 1.41, and then after given the 
alternative outcome mitigation strategy the magnitude turns to 0.81. This means that the 
mitigation strategy from the evaluators’ side can mitigate the bias by 0.59 (42.2%). The 
difference is statistically insignificant, which means that there is no difference in 
effectiveness between single and alternative outcome mitigation strategy. Furthermore, 
when auditors are given foresight decision aids multiple outcome, the bias magnitude is 
1.22, which means that the strategy is mitigated bias by 0.75 (38.10%). On the judges’ side 
alternative stakeholder strategy mitigated hindsight bias by 0.53 (37.78%). The contrasted 
mean of all strategy is not significant. 
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Table 6: ANOVA Finding for Effectiveness of Mitigation Strategy to Mitigate 
Predictive and Evaluative Judgment Error 
 
Panel A: ANOVA Table  
 SS  Df MS F Sig. 
Between Group      5,227     3 1,742 1,313 0,273 
Within Group 164,516 124 1,327     
Total 169,742 127       
Panel B: Mean response 
 Mitigation Strategy Mean SD N 
Mitigation 
Strategy 
 
F_SO 0,5625 1,11984   32 
F_MO 0,8281 1,57403   32 
H_AO 0,9688 0,92403   32 
H_AS 1,1094 0,84942   32 
Total   128 
Panel C: Mean contrast 
Contras
a)
  Mitigation Strategy Hipothesis Sig 
F_SO  vs  F_MO 
        H4 
0,793 
F_SO  vs  H_AO 0,495 
F_SO  vs  H_AS 0,234 
F_MO  vs  H_AO 0,962 
F_MO  vs  H_AS 0,763 
H_AO  vs  H_AS 0,962 
a). Contras used two-tailed tests 
 
4.5 Additional Analysis 
 
Auditors are asked to provide assessment of importance of the information factors before 
deciding to make adjustment related to the obsolescence of inventory. So are the subject 
judges, before they evaluate the auditors’ decision. 
 
Each group of information is composited, then subtracted, resulting in a net score. The 
binomial test result shows that auditors of foresight group have shown statistically no 
significant difference. This means that the negative information is not more important than 
the positive information, vice versa. For groups: hindsight, foresight+SO and foresight+MO, 
all have a negative net score. The binomial test result shows that there are significant 
differences between negative and positive information, which means that the subjects 
consider negative information has a higher probability to occur when conducting an 
adjustment decision. Evaluators in general also expect the auditors consider more negative 
information when decisions making process. 
 
5. Conclusion, Limitations and Implications 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
The existence of the hindsight bias is real for both auditors ex ante and evaluators ex post. 
Foresight group of auditors shows a significantly different response than the hindsight 
group. This finding shows that the expectation of auditors in foresight can be altered closer 
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to the expectation of the evaluators in hindsight. On the contrary, evaluators’ perception in 
evaluating auditors’ performance ex ante can move closer to the foresight perspective. 
Auditors tend to be more susceptible to cognitive bias exposure than evaluators. The 
magnitude of judgment error experienced by auditors is more than evaluators. Therefore, it 
is easier to change the thinking process of auditors to the hindsight perspective than to 
change the evaluators to the foresight perspective. The results show that four mitigating 
strategy conducted in narrowing the gap provides relatively the same moderating effect. 
The other hand, auditors in making a decision are found to pay more attention to negative 
than positive information. This finding is consistent with the conservative attitude 
possessed by auditors.  
 
5.2 Implications 
 
The findings provide new insight and bring implications to the development of psychosocial 
theory in Indonesia, especially in the implementation in auditing. This research also (1) 
provides the first empirical evidence and explanation on hindsight bias phenomenon in 
Indonesia, and its mitigation strategy, and (2) serves as the pioneer for subsequent 
research in further discovering the hindsight bias and in testing the various mitigation 
strategies. In addition, (3) the case material that use the obsolescence of inventory, will 
inspire the development of case material on other fields, such as internal control system, 
budgeting, managerial performance evaluation, and so on. The practical implication of this 
research is generally related to the improvement of planning quality, auditing jobs, and 
auditors’ legal liability. The results can be implemented through management control 
system and as guidance for the accounting profession in determining the appropriate 
strategy in improving planning quality and auditing tasks.  
 
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions  
 
Findings in this research indicate that experience may affect the magnitude of cognitive 
bias and its mitigation strategy effectiveness. The next research should retest this research 
model using experienced auditors and/or judges as subjects. Second, case materials used 
in these experiments are only about one aspect of auditing practice that is the 
obsolescence of inventory. It does not widely cover all setting of the real world in auditing 
practice. It is necessary to consider using other case materials, such as internal control 
system, bankruptcy cases, taxes cases, and so on. Third, considering that auditing 
decision is more of a collective decision of a team or group, the next research should 
deliberate on using a group as decision making subjects. 
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